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AFTER SAN JACINTO: SANTA ANNA'S ROLE IN
TEXAS INDEPENDENCE
RANDALL M. MILLER
On the afternoon of April 21, 1836. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, President of
Mexico and general of her armies, roused from his siesta to the shrill yells of charging
Texans. El Presidente rushed from his tent and seeing his anny dissolving before Sam
Houston's assault. he stole a mare and charged through the Texans' lines. Santa Anna
fled from San Jacinto to a small shack where he traded his military garb for the
cotton jacket and pants of the peasant. 1 But within days Santa Anna was captured
and 'easily recognized by the Texans. For him the Texas campaign was over. He now
had to think of his own safety and that of his army. For General Sam Houston and
the Texas rebels a miracle had occurred at San Jacinto with the defeat and capture of
the Mexican president. The Texans had demonstrated the ability to win and now
seemed prepared to assume de facto independence.

\

Santa Anna's imprisonment and its international ramifications provided a curious
insight into the nature of the man. At the same time, it also illustrated the vagaries of
Mexican-American relations during the Texan crisis. The role that the captured
president played in this struggle, perhaps better than any other incident, demonstrated
the desperation of the Texan cause and its frustrated international relations.
Initially, Santa Anna's confmement at Velasco was not really burdensome. On
May 14, 1836, the Texans convinced Santa Anna to sign two treaties, one private and
one public. The public document saw Santa Anna agree to evacuate all Mexican
troops beyond the Rio Grande, to exchange prisoners and personally never again to
take up arms against Texas. In the private treaty Texas promised Santa Anna's
immediate release and return to Vera Cruz on his word to try to influence the
Mexican government toward accepting a Texas delegation to discuss independence and
the boundary.2
Santa Anna then ordered his generals to leave the area in question and began his
own preparations for the return to Mexico. He knew that Texan anger and the
volcanic nature of Mexican politics made it highly undesirable to remain long in
Texas. President Burnet in an attempt to keep Texas' part of the May 14 treaty, had
Santa Anna placed on the Invincible which was at Valesco.
As the Invincible was about to embark, however, a group of 130 Texas
volunteers learned of Santa Anna's presence and promptly kidnapped him from the
ship. The volunteers were perhaps ignorant or did not care about any private
arrangements Santa. Anna had with the Texas government. Santa Anna was soon
returned to Columbia, Texas, where he remained for the next month and a half.
Unnerved by the ridicule and threats of execution that Texas rowdies cast upon him,
EI Presidente complained that Texas was defaulting on its agreements. That
unfortunate remark prompted Texas President Burnet to reply on June 10, that Santa
Anna's bloody history at the Alamo and Goliad did not warrant his freedom.
Moreover, the Texan reminded Santa Anna that he would decide when the Mexican
had fulftlled his part of the agreements. 3
Santa Anna's return to imprisonment occasioned several attempts on his life.
Waving the bloody shirt of Goliad, troublemakers found audiences eager to taunt the
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hapless general. On one occasion an irate Texan nred a shot into Santa Anna?s cell,
almost hitting the general's aide, Colonel Juan Nepomuceno Almonte. Santa Anna was

further discomforted when the Texans placed a heavy ball and chain around his leg.
The real burden, however, was the rumored execution that the Texas government was
planning. 4
Feeling was running high among Texans that Santa Anna be returned to Goliad
and executed at the site of the massacre,s The Texas Secretary of W:rr and another
Cabinet member sought Santa Anna's death. The Secretary of War, MUIaheau B
Lamar, urged that the cabinet try Santa Anna as a felon for Fannin's murder ana
summarily execute him. 6
By June 3D, Santa Anna later wrote most Texans were prepared to effect his
murder when Stephen F. Austin, founder of the Texas colony and still its paternal
leader, inten'ened, suggesting that Santa Anna appeal to President Andrew Jackson of
the United States to intervene on his behalf. 7 Santa Anna wrote to Jackson on July
4, saying that his abduction from the Invincible might prove fatal for Texas if he were
not soon returned to Vera Cruz. Santa Anna reminded Jackson that although he had
ordered General Filisola to leave Texas, the Mexican government had since sent a large
force under General Jose Urrea to reconquer the territory. Unless he. Santa Anna,
appeared in Mexico, he would have no control over Urrea. To further his case for
Jackson's intervention, Santa Anna also suggested that political negotiations would
best serve the interests of all parties and he added the hope that he could negotiate
for the Mexican government. 8

Jackson, writing from the Hermitage, did not reply until September 4, when
Mexican-American relations were sufficiently strained to warrant a United States
intrusion into the Texas affair. In his letter Jackson gladly accepted Santa Anna's
suggestion for mediation of the U.S. between Mexico and Texas. He also noted that
Santa Anna was no longer a representative of the Mexican government, but that he
would use Santa Anna's letter as the basis for an interview· with the Mexican Minister
in Washington. Jackson thus opened the door for American interferem:e and the
Texans quickly grasped at it. 9
Jackson's seeming willingness to intervene was an important victory for Austin
and Houston who believed that the Texan's only hope for sUMvallay in annexation
to the United States. The Texan dream of annexation was not a wild fantasy either,
for Jackson and the United States had a long history of trying to purchase the area of
Texas.

•

Jackson's first attempt to buy Texas occurred in 1829 when the U.S. Charge de'
Affaires. Anthony Butler, sent Jackson two papers praising the geography and
character of the region. Jackson wrote his Secretary of State, Martin Van Buren, a
memo authorizing Joel Poinsett to represent the U.S. in negotiating for the area.
Jackson reasoned that since Texas was being settled largely by Americans, the United
States would always have an intense interest in the area. For the same reason the
Mexican government would do well to eliminate a potential source of friction and
earn some cash at the same time. With the rise of Anastasio Bustamente and Lucas
Alaman, however, such proposals fell to the wayside. The anti-American Alaman on
February 8, 1830, clearly stated Mexico's opposition to American overtures on Texas
and closed the matter. Rather than aggravate Mexican-American relations, Jackson laid
the issue to rest until a more advantageous occasion arose. 20

52

EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL JOURNAL

The decline of the Bustamante-Alaman group and the rise of the Santa
Anna-Valentin Gomez Farias faction saw Anthony Butler reopen the issue, quite
independently of Washington. Butler's offer for cash appealed to Santa Anna who was
already irritated by the Texans' clamor for statehood. The outbreak of the Texas
revolt in 1835, however, changed Santa Anna's mind. In fact, he aecused Butler and
the United States of intrigue in stirring up Texan revolution and demanded Butler's
recall. The United States responded by replacing Butler with .Powhatten Ellis, but it
was already too late to erase the odor of American interference) 1

Santa Anna's captors realized that Mexican-American relations had rcached their
nadir with the Texas revolt. They hoped that Jackson would therefore be less
reluctant to apply force and diplomacy on the Texans' behalf. The success of Texan
recruitment in the United States and the Mexican charges of American conspiracy
only increased the dislocation between the Mexican and American governments. On
the Mexican side, the attitude was one of bitterness and hate. El Diorio del Gobiemo
summed up Mexican feelings when it observed, "we are aware that the whole nation,
particularly New Orleans, is the parent of all the villains in the world. "12
Mexican-American relations almost suffered a formal break after Jackson
dispatched a detachment of troops under General E.P. Gaines to occupy the
U.S.-Texas border. Jackson's stated motive was the fear of Comanche incursions into
American territory, but Gaines' presence at the border appeared to be an
encouragment to the Texans. When the Mexican Minister Extraordinary, Manuel
Eduardo Gorostiza, proved unable to garner American assurances not to let Gaines
cross the border "in pursuit of Indians," he called for his credentials and left
Washington in a rage. Before he departed he published an incendiary pamphlet
attacking American policy that did little to smooth Mexican-American relations,13
This crisis, which occurred late in 1836, left the Texans convinced that Jackson would
feel vindictive enough to seek some kind of pro-American solution to the Texan
problem. Accordingly, they stepped-up their annexation campaign,14

L
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The Texans began to gear their entire politics toward achieving annexation. The
immediate hurille, however, was recognition by both Mexico and the United States.
On Mexico's part, Houston believed he held the trump card, Santa Anna. iS But Santa
Anna would be of little use unless the United States granted recognition. In order to
win American recognition, Houston had to keep the Texan anny :in one piece (a
difficult task with the Mexican troop build-up in 'Ute area) and he had to prove to
Jackson that Texas enjoyed a de facto government. Hoping to fmd out to what extent
Texas controlled her own fate, Jackson sent a special agent to Texas.I6 At the same
time, Texas sent Major James Collinsworth to Washington to plead the Texan case.
Texas also elected Jackson's good friend, Sam Houston, to the Presidency as an
additional lure for Jackson.! 7
The role that Santa Anna was intended to play in the Texas scheme grew larger
as each day passed with no hint of American recognition. Santa Anna's influence in
Mexico had declined steadily since his capture. In early May the U.S. Charge de'
Affaires could report that <The influence of Santa Anna ... is still great. HIS But by
May 20, the hard-line Bustamante crowd, who took power in Santa Anna's absence,
had passed a resolution in the Mexican Congress declaring that any agreement that
Santa Anna signed while a prisoner was invalid for the Mexican government.! 9
Bustamante and his cohorts did not wish to see Santa Anna return. ]n fact, as
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Powhatten Ellis remarked, ''Those in power are exceedingly fearful lest Santa Anna
return. ''20 Other Mexicans were not even sure if Santa Anna was still alive and
expressed a hope that such was the case, for it might help end the tiresome Texan

war. 21
With Santa Anna's influence waning, Houston realized that he had to utilize his
hostage as soon as possible. Houston therefore defied the will of the Texan Congress,
who did not want to release Santa Anna under any circumstances, and moved for the
Mexican's release to Jackson's custody.22 One observer rightly noted that Houston
desired Santa Anna's release because the Mexican's tenn as President expired March 1,
1837. Unless he reached Mexico before that date, all shred of legality for Santa
Anna's dealings Was lost. Moreover, Santa Anna's release to Jackson would technically
make any agreements with the United States valid since Santa Anna would no longer
be a prisoner bound by the May 20 decree. 23
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Using the exchange of letters between Santa Anna and Jackson as a pretext,
Houston and Austin prepared for Santa Anna's trip to Washington, believing that EI
Presidente would effect his promise to seek a negotiated settlement with recognition
of Texas independence in exchange for an indemnity and his freedom. Houston also
wanted to get Santa Anna out of Texas for public relations reasons. A little humanity
on the Texans' part could hardly hurt their case.
More important, Houston wanted Santa Anna back in Mexico as soon as
possibJe. Hopefully, Santa Anna would return to power and honor his verbal and
written agreements. At the very least, many Texans believed Santa Anna's return
would create enough consternation for the Bustamante government that the Mexican
war effort would suffer. 24
While Santa Anna was not aware of all of these manuevers, he was confident
that he was going to Washington. By November his optimism had erased his earlier
despair. Rumors of executions, even after Austin's June 30 intervention, haunted El
Presidente. Most deflating was the aborted escape attempt of August 16, which saw
the Mexican consul at New Orleans and Santa Anna's secretary, Martinez Caro, reveal
the plot to the Texas authorities. Santa Anna and his constant companion, Almonte,
were soon placed in chains, but before that disgrace was performed, Santa Anna
unsuccessfully attempted suicide with an overdose of some narcotic. He suffered only
nausea and embarrassment, but by November, with the hope of freedom, Santa Anna
had reaffmned his faith in life. 2S
Confident that Santa Anna was sincere in his promise to seek a peaceful solution
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to the war, Austin, Burnet and Houston prepared the General for his Washington

joumey.26 Houston appointed Colonel George W. Hockley of Tennessee, Major
William H. Patton who was also from Tennessee. and Colonel Bernard E. Bee of South
Carolina to escort Santa Anna. With Santa Anna went his friend and interpreter,
Colonel Almonte, who was well-educated, handsome and well-mannered, all qualities
needed to impress Washington officials. 27
The party left Orizimba on November 16, determined to reach Washington by
early January, despite the winter. After crossing the Texas border into the United
States, they boarded the riverboat Tennessee and for twenty days steamed up the
Mississippi River to the Ohio River before ice finally 'forced them to disembark fifty
miles short of Louisville. Gathering supplies, the small band proceeded to Lexington,
Kentucky. where the procession halted, Santa Anna's health was poor at best and the
cold air created fung congestion. At Brennan's Hotel a certain Dr. Dudley attended
the General until he felt strong enough to continue the journey. After several days the
group returned to the road. swinging up through eastern Ohio and Wheeling, Virginia.
before arriving in Washincton about lanuarv 17_ lR::t728
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h'~b\norsL~lt~ tfie real purpose of the

trip accompanied Santa Anna all the way
to the capitol. Most onlookers found the GeneIal "courteous, intelligent and
~~'2t~'Fcounts believed Santa Anna was really going to seek Texas
G~ghi on an~ ilUWffl:HWwith Mexico. 30 Others believed that Jackson had made
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ah)' 'respoiiSibfe for some secret treaty commitments by Santa Anna. 3 ]

Others still were less sympathetic toward the General and were not convinced that he
had changed his demon's cloak. Tennessee, where Texas gamerered the most
volunteers, proved the least cordial to Santa Anna. One account even intimated that
the Mexican's layover in Lexington was not for health but had been a "contrivance on
his [Santa Anna] part to afford time to General Bravo to make eruption into
Texas. "32 Whatever the case, all anixously awaited the outcome of Santa Anna's
interview with Jackson.
Despite the ill health of both Santa Anna and Jackson, both men sought an
interview at the earliest convenience. On January 19, and again on January 20, Santa
Anna had private conversations with Jackson, but the content of their discussions
remained largely unknown. 33 Santa Anna later reported that he had an extremely
favorable impression of Jackson, and he always maintained a respect for the man, so
the conversations must have been at least amicable. 34
With the intenriews in progress, Texas Minister Wharton reached the height of his
optimism. He seemed little disturbed that nothing appeared in writing since Santa
Anna was so laudatory in his promises of Texas independence. 35 Jackson probably
discussed little that had not appeared in the exchange of letters, since Santa Anna had
no official powers. He certainly gave the Texans cause for hope, however, since he
made Santa Anna a proposal to present to the Mexican government, entailing a
Mexican cession of the area along the Rio Grande from its mouth through the 38th
parallel and then to the Pacific Ocean. For this the United States offered to pay $3.5
millian. 36
After a round af dinners, the now much admit-ed Mexican general left
Washington on January 26, headed far Baltimore. MeanWhile, the American
government prepared the corvette Pioneer for Santa Anna's return to Vera Cruz.
Taking the steamship Pocahantas to Norfolk, Virginia, Santa Anna was able to embark
on the Pioneer by early February .37 As to the reception he would receive upon his
arrival in Mexico, he could only specUlate, but he had achieved his most important
objective, freedom.
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Houston and the Texans awaited news of both Santa Anna"s interviews and his
reception in Mexico. Houston was confident that "Santa Anna's reception will be
hailed with pleasure in Mexico by a large majority."38 Houston and most Americans
believed that as a popular leader Santa Anna would immediately stage a coup and
open a new era in Mexican politics. 39
Bustamante, however, held the same fears and prepared for the return of EI
Presidente. As of January 11, Bustamante had declared Santa Anna an outlaw, to be
shot if he ever stepped foot on Mexican territary.40 Many Mexicans agreed since they
thought that Santa Anna"s release was an American-Texan plot to stir up dissension in
Mexico. 41 According to United States somces. Santa Anna"s impending return reached
crisis proportions for Bustamante when the governoI of Yucatan, General Toro,
refused to yield his command to Bustamante, claiming Santa Anna was still EI

•
,.

EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL JOURNAL

.

,

•

•

,

•

•

ss

Presidente. 42
Whether by sixth sense or advanced information, Santa Anna was cognizant of
the Mexican situation and chose to avoid revolution. He realized that he had
compromised his position in the eyes of most Mexicans after his military defeat and
seeming collaboration with the enemy. Wisely, he Quietly slipped away to the
comforts of his hacienda. Manga de Clava. There he began to rebuild his power.
In order to regain influence in Mexico, Santa Anna had to prove he had not lost
his machismo. Santa Anna immediately prepared a Manijiesto (May 10, 1837)
describing his campaign and the causes and consequences of his captivity. He also
defended himself against allegations of treason. He pointed out that no one, neither
Mexico nor himself, was bound by his treaties, which were little more than falsas
apariencias in order to safeguard Mexican interests and bide time for Mexican annies.
He went on to say that the only promises he ever gave were personal; he had never
compromised Mexican integrity.43

In a letter to the Mexican Secretary of War and Navy, Santa Anna went on to
explain the Washington trip as a ruse on his part in order to gain his freedom. He
stated that he needed a safer route than New Orleans afforded and he wanted an
opportunity to sound out the American cabinet on its real attitudes toward Texas and
Mexico. 44 Throughout the remainder of his life Santa Anna would insist that the
Texas revolution was an American war of aggression and that his trip to Washington
had not only saved his own life, but had placed the burden of conscience directly on
the American government. 45
In the end Santa Anna's tactics worked. Bustamante did not press for Santa
Anna's execution, allowing Santa Anna time to regain his machismo. Forlornly, the
American consul, unaware of the Latin American mind, noted that by April,
Gen. Santa Anna still remains at his Hacienda de Muaya de Gavo, the
panick, among his enemies, and the hopes, of his friends, which his return
excited, seems to have aU subsided.46
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Most important, Santa Anna's pledge that he did not suborn Mexican integrity
earned some credibility when Jackson withdrew the troops from the American-Texas
border. 47 And when Jackson refused to move for Texas annexation, Santa Anna's
stock rose higher. Moreover, the delay in American annexation, occasioned more by
domestic than international pressures, allowed Benjamin Lundy and his abolitionist
friends to organize an effective resistance to Texas annexation. By the time lame duck
President Tyler granted Texas annexation in 1845, Santa Anna had regained power in
Mexico and was able to refight the Texas issue.
Santa Anna had survived his Texas imprisonment because Texans like Austin and
Houston were desperate for annexation. These men were willing to place confidence
in the enigmatic Santa Anna because he was their one shred of legality. But Santa
Anna was prudent enough not to sign any document too odious to Mexican thinking
and he never promised more than personal obligations. He had, through his own
inaction, also subverted any Texan or American psuedo-intervention in Mexican
politics. Santa Anna, here as he often would do later. proved able to effect the
necessary somersaults among his enemies to stay alive. He rarely missed an
opportunity for advancement, and in Mexico there were many. For Santa Anna the
wait was not long. The French were already plotting their invasiotL
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